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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Thomas M. Winn, III *
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times."1 For both
Virginia employers and employees alike, this sentiment rang true
over the past year in the employment law arena, with both camps
winning and losing battles as they litigated various employment law
matters. This article discusses three principal areas where there was
substantial activity in Virginia's courts: public policy wrongful
discharge claims; negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims;
and the enforcement of noncompetition agreements. Beyond the
scope of this article are decisions rendered in other areas of law
affecting the employment relationship, including the areas of
workers' compensation,2 unemployment,3 public sector employment,4
* Associate, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. A.B., 1990, Duke
University; J.D., 1993, cum laude, University ofRichmond School of Law. Mr. Winngratefully
acknowledges the research and editorial contributions of Allison Cox, a summer associate
with the firm.
1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CrTIES 13 (New American Library of World
Literature, Inc. 1964) (1859).
2. See, e.g., Granados v. Windson Dev. Corp., 257 Va. 103, 108-09, 509 S.E.2d 290,293
(1999) (affirming the denial of benefits to an illegal alien because he was not a lawful
"employee" within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act); Prince William County
Serv. Auth. v. Harper, 256 Va. 277, 280, 504 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1998) (holding that an
employee's misrepresentation on her employment application did not prohibit her from
receiving workers' compensation benefits because her misrepresentation was not causally
related to her injury); Clegg v. Local 149 UAW, 46 Va. Cir. 192, 197 (Winchester City 1998)
(ruling that the Workers' Compensation statute does not bar an employee's ability to recover
under Virginia's Right to Work Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-67 (Repl. Vol. 1994)).
3. See, e.g., Virginia Employment Comm'n v. Davenport, 29 Va. App. 26, 29-30, 509
S.E.2d 522,524 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the term "during thirty days" denotes a number
of days, not hours to total 30 days, that an employee must actually work to receive
unemployment benefits); Yard Bird, Inc. v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 28 Va. App. 215,
225, 503 S.E.2d 246, 251 (Ct. App. 1998) (affirming that for purposes of unemployment
compensation, exotic dancers were employees of club rather than independent contractors
because of the control and direction club asserted over dancers); Baker v. Virginia
Employment Comm'n, No. 98-8,1998 WL 972284, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Winchester City July 23,
1998) (unreported decision) (finding employee's failure to immediately report work-related
injury was not a willful violation of a company rule); Saulnier v. Virginia Employment
Comm'n, 45 Va. Cir. 290, 291 (Arlington County 1998) (upholding Virginia Employment
Commission's denial of benefits for employee's failure to appeal within 21-day period
mandated by section 60.2-620(B) of the Virginia Code); Powell v. United States Postal Serv.,
45 Va. Cir. 149, 150-51 (Loudoun County 1998) (holding that a decision of the Virginia
Employment Commission maybe based on hearsay evidence and courts must defer to hearing
examiner with regard to credibility of witnesses).
4. See, e.g., Virginia Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Wright, 256 Va. 236,241-42,504 S.E.2d
862, 864-65 (1998) (ruling that the circuit court overstepped its authority either to implement
or refuse to implement the hearing officer's decision under section 2.1-116.07(D) of the
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and tort actions based on defamation5 and infliction of emotional
distress.6
I. CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY
Virginia, like many states, traditionally has adhered to the
principle of employment-at-will.7 As the Supreme Court of Virginia
explained in Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks:'
Virginia strongly adheres to the common law employment-at-will
doctrine. We have repeatedly stated: "Virginia adheres to the common-
law rule that when the intended duration of a contract for the rendition
of services cannot be determined by fair inference from the terms of the
contract, then either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate the
contract at will .... I
Virginia Code, when it ordered reinstatement of the employee); Bohannon v. Commonwealth,
46 Va. Cir. 411, 411-12 (Richmond City 1998) (holding that the refusal of a state agency to
allow an employee to withdraw her resignation in order to extend the 30-day deadline for
filing grievances was not a grievable matter); Runnels v. O'Neill, 46 Va. Cir. 208,210 (Fairfax
County 1998) ("When an employee asserts, in good faith, a grievance which presents an
objectively reasonable allegation of a violation of applicable policies, procedures, rules, or
regulations, the complaint is grievable and is subject to a merits determination by the Civil
Service Commission."); County of Fairfax v. Fairfax County Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 153630
(Va. Cir. Ct. Fairfax County June 12, 1998) (holding that Virginia Code section 15.2-1507
prohibits judicial review of a county Civil Service Commission's findings).
5. See, e.g., Doran v. Sigmon, No. 97-0023-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6219, at *30 (W.D.
Va. Mar. 23, 1998) (unreported decision) (holding that a private healthcare agency could be
liable for allegedly defamatory comments made about an ex-employee by its office manager);
Eslami v. Global One Communications, Inc., No. 174096,1999 WL 51864, at *5-6 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Fairfax County Jan. 11, 1999) (unreported decision) (overruling the defendant's demurrer to
a defamation claim by holding that statements that an employee "did not fit in" and "lost his
temper" could constitute the basis of a defamation claim).
6. See, e.g., Blake v. Timber Truss Hous. Sys., Inc., No. 97-00097-C, 1998 WL 213699,
at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 14, 1998) (unreported decision) (dismissing the claim of a former
employee for intentional infliction of emotional distress allegedly caused by the outrageous
comments of her employer because the comments did not rise to a sufficient level of
outrageousness); Flayhart v. Interocean Ugland Management Corp., 45 Va. Cir. 542, 545
(Norfolk City 1998) (sustaining a demurrer to a count of intentional infliction of emotional
distress because plaintiffs distress was not so severe that a reasonable person could not
endure it); Shifflett v. Food Lion, Inc., 45 Va. Cir. 475,478 (Albemarle County 1998) (holding
that a supermarket could be sued for emotional distress by two women who alleged that a
"Peeping Tom" employee spied on them while they used the restroom).
7. See, e.g., Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586,594, 164 S.E. 397,399 (1932).
8. 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996).
9. Id. at 96-97,465 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp.,
247 Va. 98, 102, 439 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994)).
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Thus, where no specific time period is fixed for the duration of
employment, there is a presumption that employment is at-will,
terminable at any time by either party for any reason, with or
without cause.'" The employment-at-will doctrine ordinarily
precludes terminated at-will employees from asserting common-law
causes of action for wrongful discharge or wrongful termination of
employment."
In the seminal case of Bowman v. State Bank of Keysvilte,'2 the
Supreme Court of Virginia recognized a "narrow exception" to the
employment-at-will doctrine for the first time. 3 The Bowman court
found that at-will employees may have an actionable claim for
wrongful discharge if the employee can identify a public policy that
was violated by the termination of his or her employment.'4 The
plaintiffs, who were employees and shareholders of the bank,
opposed a proposed merger of the bank with another corporation.'
Under threat of termination, the plaintiffs voted their shares in
favor of the merger.' When the plaintiffs later rescinded their
favorable votes, the merger was aborted and, shortly thereafter, the
bank discharged the plaintiffs.'7 The plaintiffs filed suit seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for"improper discharge." 8 The
lower court sustained a demurrer to the claim, relying on the
employment-at-will doctrine and the absence of any evidence of a
contract of employment for a definite period of time."
On appeal, the defendant bank and individual directors contended
that any change to the employment-at-will doctrine should be made
by the legislature and not by the court.2" The plaintiffs argued that
"their discharges were premised solely upon the proper exercise of
their protected rights as shareholders."2' The issue before the
supreme court was "whether [an] employer can, with absolute
immunity, discharge these employees in retaliation for the proper
10. See, e.g., id.; Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 535, 331 S.E.2d 797,
798(1985).
11. See Lawrence, 251 Va. at 96-97; 465 S.E.2d at 808.
12. 229 Va. 534,331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
13. See id at 539, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 537, 331 S.E.2d at 799.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 538, 331 S.E.2d at 800.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 539, 331 S.E.2d at 800.
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exercise of [their] rights as stockholders, a reason which has nothing
to do with the employees' job performances."22
The court began its discussion by reaffirming Virginia's adherence
to
the common-law rule that when a contract calls for the rendition of
services, but the period of its intended duration cannot be determined
by a fair inference from its provisions, either party is ordinarily at
liberty to terminate the contract at will upon giving reasonable notice
of intention to terminate.n
The court nonetheless explained that the doctrine has its limits:
Virginia has not deviated from the common-law doctrine of
employment-at-will set forth in the Stonega Coal case .... And we do
not alter the traditional rule today. Nonetheless, the rule is not
absolute. The unique facts of these [two] cases require us to apply one
of the recognized exceptions to the rule of terminability.24
The court explained that the purpose of section 13.1-32 of the
Virginia Code, which confers upon each shareholder the right to one
vote for each outstanding share of stock, would be frustrated if a
shareholder, who also happens to be an employee, could not exercise
that statutory right without fear of reprisal from corporate manage-
ment.' Pointing to the decisions of twenty other states that
recognized public policy exceptions to the strict application of the at-
will doctrine, the court for the first time recognized "a narrow
exception to the employment at-will rule."26 The supreme court held
that "the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action in tort against the
Bank and the named directors for improper discharge from employ-
ment."27
Two years after Bowman, the Supreme Court of Virginia again
addressed the availability of wrongful discharge claims in Miller v.
SEVAMP, Inc.2" In Miller, the plaintiff alleged that her discharge
"was malicious, wrongful, and tortious, done in retaliation for her
22. Id.
23. Id. at 535,331 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 106 Va. 223, 226, 55 S.E. 551, 552 (1906)).
24. Id. at 539, 331 S.E.2d at 800-01 (citing Wards Co. v. Lewis & Dobrow, Inc., 210 Va.
751, 756, 173 S.E.2d 861,865 (1970); Plaskitt v. Black Diamond Trailer Co., 209 Va. 460, 164
S.E.2d 645 (1968); Title Ins. Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 718, 164 S.E. 387, 389 (1932)).
25. See id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
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appearance as a witness at [a] fellow-employee's grievance
hearing."29 The lower court sustained the employer's demurrer,
citing the at-will rule. ° On appeal, the issue before the court was
"whether the tort of 'retaliatory discharge' is generally actionable in
Virginia."
31
In analyzing the claim, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained
that in Bowman the employee's discharge was tortious because it
"violated the public policy underlying Virginia's securities and
corporation laws."32 The court emphasized the limited nature of its
holding, and stated that "Bowman applied a'narrow exception to the
employment-at-will rule,' but it fell far short of recognizing a
generalized cause of action for the tort of 'retaliatory discharge.' 33
Instead, the court explained that "Bowman recognized an exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine limited to discharges which
violate public policy, that is, the policy underlying existing laws
designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health,
safety, or welfare of the people in general."34
The public policy exception recognized in Bowman was "not so
broad as to make actionable those discharges of at-will employees
which violate only private rights or interests."35 The supreme court
emphasized in this regard that:
The employment-at-will doctrine is a settled part of the law of Virginia.
Parties negotiating contracts for the rendition of services are entitled
to rely on its continued stability. Serious policy considerations, affecting
countless business relationships, are involved in any change that may
be contemplated. We therefore think it wise to leave to the deliberative
processes of the General Assembly any substantial alteration of the
doctrine.6
Turning to the facts in the case before it, the court noted that the
plaintiff was allegedly discharged in retaliation for exercising her
right under the employer's personnel policies to testify freely before
grievance review panels." The court rejected the availability of the
29. Id. at 464, 362 S.E.2d at 916.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 463, 362 S.E.2d at 916.
32. Id. at 467, 362 S.E.2d at 918.
33. Id. at 467-68,362 S.E.2d at 918 (citingBowman, 229 Va. at 540,331 S.E.2d at 801).
34. Id. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 919 (emphasis added).
37. See id.
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plaintiffs discharge claim, explaining that her discharge implicated
only private rights established by the employer's internal regula-
tions, and "would have no impact upon anypublic policy established
by existing laws for the protection of the public generally."8
One issue that practitioners have grappled with since the court's
decisions in Bowman and Miller is what sources provide an action-
able foundation for public policy claims. Courts and commentators
express varying views of where the courts may find expressions of
the "public policy" that is necessary to support wrongful discharge
claims. The plaintiffs' bar has argued that county and city ordi-
nances, the Virginia Constitution, and even federal statutes should
all be seen as a basis for the "public policy" of the Commonwealth of
Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia provided guidance on this
issue in Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks. 9 In that case,
an employee alleged that he was fired because he refused to perform
certain repairs on an automobile.4" The plaintiff contended:
[T]o repair a car in such a manner as was requested in this case is an
obvious violation of both statutory and common law duties, including
duties under the Consumer Protection laws, the Automobile Salvage
laws (Virginia Code §§ 46.2-1600 to [-1610]), and common law duties of
the dealership concerning the exercise of due care.41
The court disagreed, stating, "[w]e simply find no language in
Code §§ 46.2-1600 through -1610 (which govern salvage, nonrepair-
able, and rebuilt vehicles) that supports Brooks' position."42 In a
passage that counsel for employers have emphasized as a critical
aspect of the decision, the supreme court explained:
More telling, Brooks does not specify what precise statute that
Lawrence Chrysler purportedly contravened. InBowman andLockhart,
the plaintiffs, who were permitted to pursue causes of action against
their former employers, identified specific Virginia statutes in which
the General Assembly had established public policies that the former
employers had contravened. Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and
Lockhart, Brooks does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge
because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a
public policy that Lawrence Chrysler violated. We also reject Brooks'
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996).
40. See id. at 95-96, 465 S.E.2d at 807-08.




attempt to expand the narrow exception we recognized in Bowman by
relying upon so-called "common law duties of the dealership."3
Thus, after Brooks, a compelling argument is available that public
policy claims must be grounded in an expression of policy embodied
in a Virginia statute."
Over the past year, the courts of Virginia continued to evaluate
which expressions of policy provide an actionable foundation for the
common-law tort ofwrongful discharge. Creative plaintiffs' attorneys
have roamed the legislative landscape in attempts to navigate
claimants around the employment-at-will doctrine. What follows is
a discussion of the various sources of public policy and theories of
recovery upon which plaintiffs have attempted to rely in establishing
viable claims.
A- The Virginia Human Rights Act/Discriminatory Discharge
Claims
By far the most active area of litigation addressing the common-
law tort of wrongful discharge concerns alleged violations of the
public policy against discrimination in employment as articulated in
the Virginia Human Rights Act ("VHRA'),45 as well as other
provisions of Virginia and federal law. The body of law generated by
these decisions culminated in what arguably was the most signifi-
cant state employment law decision of the past several years, Conner
v. National Pest Control Assn.46 Conner appears to have resolved an
ongoing debate in the courts, the legislature, and the news media for
the last half of this decade over whether the common law of Virginia
provides a cause of action for discriminatory discharges.
43. Id. at 98-99,465 S.E.2d at 809 (emphasis added); see also Dray v. New Market Poultry
Prod., Inc., No. 981767, 1999 WL 731399, at *2 (Va. Sept. 17, 1999) (rejecting a public policy
wrongful discharge claim because the Virginia statute cited by the plaintiff "affords plaintiff
no express statutory right... that is in specific furtherance of the state's public policy").
44. In a later case, the Supreme Court of Virginia indicated that the Brooks decision
created a "requirement" for "identifying a statutory embodiment of the public policy of the
Commonwealth." Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121,126,480 S.E.2d 502,505 (1997);
see also Wenig v. Hecht Co., 47 Va. Cir. 290, 293 (Fairfax County 1998) ("Wenig argues that
a federal stdtute can serve as the basis for her wrongful termination action. This argument
fails in that Wenig is obliged to cite a Virginia statute to support her claim.").
45. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-714 to -725 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
46. 257 Va. 286, 513 S.E.2d 398(1999).
1999]
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1. Origins of the Discriminatory Discharge Claim
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in a four to three decision,
ruled that employees could maintain wrongful discharge actions for
racial and gender discrimination based on the public policies
underlying the VHRA" At that time, the VHRA provided, in
pertinent part:
It is the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia:
1. To safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from
unlawful discrimination because ofrace, color, religion, national origin,
sex, age, marital status or disability... in employment ......
Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create, an
independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions. Nor
shall the policies or provisions of this chapter be construed to allow tort
actions to be instituted instead of or in addition to the current statutory
actions for unlawful discrimination.4
9
Lockhart decided the consolidated cases of two employees.
Lawanda Lockhart alleged that Commonwealth Education Systems
discharged her due to her opposition to racially discriminatory
practices.5 ° Nancy Wright asserted that her employer fired her
because she rejected the sexual advances of her employer.5' In both
cases, the lower courts refused to allow the actions to proceed on the
ground that the VHRA did not create a basis for private suits.5 2
On appeal, the supreme court held that a plaintiff could assert a
claim for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against
gender or race discrimination expressed in the VHRA." The court
reasoned that since the VHRA prohibits employment discrimination
based on race and sex, employees discharged on the basis of such
protected characteristics could challenge their discharge in a state
47. See Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98,106,439 S.E.2d 328,332
(1994).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
49. Id. § 2.1-725. (Cum. Supp. 1994).
50. See Lockhart, 247 Va. at 100-01, 439 S.E.2d at 329.
51. See id. at 101-02, 439 S.E.2d at 329-30.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
[Vol. 33:965
1999] EMPLOYMENT LAW
tort action under the narrow public policy exception to employment-
at-will announced in Bowman.54 The majority in Lockhart held that
the public policy contained in the VHRA supported a public policy
discriminatory discharge claim, despite what appeared to be clear
language foreclosing causes of action based on the policies expressed
in the Act.55 The opinion exposed employers to potential claims not
contemplated by the federal antidiscrimination statutes." As a
result, plaintiffs' lawyers began to file wrongful discharge tort claims
in addition to, and in some cases instead of, discriminatory discharge
claims under federal law.57
54. See id. at 105-06, 439 S.E.2d at 331-32.
55. See id. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332. In Bradick v. Grumman Data Sys. Corp., 254 Va.
156,486 S.E.2d 545 (1997), the Supreme Court of Virginia held
based on the public policy expressed in the VDA and VHRA at the time of
Grumman Data's alleged act of discrimination, the common law of Virginia
provides a wrongful discharge remedy to an employee, such as Bradick, of an
employer covered by the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 where the employee
is discharged on account of his disability or the employer's perception of his
disability under the narrow exception recognized in Bowman.
Id. at 160-61,486 S.E.2d at 547; see also Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121,125,480
S.E.2d 502, 505 (1997) (reaffirming availability of wrongful discharge in violation of the
public policy against gender discrimination as expressed in VHRA); Clarkv. Manheim Serv.
Corp., 38 Va. Cir. 479, 479 (Va. 1996) (per curiam) (holding age discrimination actionable
under public policy theory).
56. Public policy discriminatory discharge actions differed from federal actions in a
number of critical ways. For example, while Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (1994), applies to employers with atleast 15 employees, wrongful discharge
actions based on the public policies underlying the Virginia Human Rights Act contained no
such restriction. Also, Title VII provides federal caps on compensatory and punitive damages
ranging from $50,000 to $300,000 depending on the size of the employer. See 42 U.S.C. §§
1981a(3) (1994). Although Virginia caps punitive damages at $350,000, there is no
compensatory damage ceiling. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992). Thus, after
Lockhart, the smallestVirginia employer was exposed to potentially unlimited damages while
the largest non-Virginia employer had compensatory and punitive damages capped under
Title VII at $300,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3)(D) (1994). Moreover, Title VII claims require
the filing of an administrative charge, an agency investigation and attempts at voluntary
resolution before a lawsuit may be filed, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, while Lockhart actions
presented no such prerequisites to suit. Finally, although federal administrative charges must
be filed within 300 days, a longer statute of limitations applied to wrongful discharge cases.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Cum. Supp. 1999) (applicable to wrongful discharge claims);
Purcell v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 250 Va. 93, 95, 458 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1995).
57. While the popularity of state law claims rose dramatically, it was unclear to what
extent, if any, the federal burden of proof standards would be applicable to the state law
claims. On February 28, 1997, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered and resolved that
issue in Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home, Inc., 253 Va. 185, 483 S.E.2d 203 (1997). In Jordan, the
plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that she was discharged "because of her race in violation of the
public policy of Virginia... prohibiting race discrimination in employment. Id. at 187,483
S.E.2d at 204 (quoting plaintiffs allegation as stated in her complaint). The fundamental
issue before the supreme court was "whether to adopt an indirect, burden shifting method of
proof [utilized under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act] in wrongful discharge cases." Id. For
cases illustrating the burden shifting under Title VII, see St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
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2. The Legislature Responds to Lockhart
In response to Lockhart, the Virginia General Assembly promptly
amended the VHRA in an apparent effort to preclude the availability
of public policy claims based on the policies set forth in the Act. 8
After the 1995 amendments, the VHRA provided:
A. Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create,
an independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions,
except as specifically provided in subsections B and C of this section.
B. No employer employing more than five but less than fifteen
persons shall discharge any such employee on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin or sex, or of age if the employee is forty years
or older.
C. The employee may bring an action in a general district or circuit
court having jurisdiction over the employer who allegedly discharged
the employee in violation of this section. Any such action shall be
brought within 180 days from the date of the discharge. The court may
award up to twelve months' back pay with interest at the judgment rate
as provided in § 6.1-330.54. However, if the court finds that either party
engaged in tactics to delay resolution of the complaint, it may (i)
diminish the award or (ii) award back pay to the date of judgment
without regard to the twelve-month limitation.
In any case where the employee prevails, the court shall award
attorney's fees from the amount recovered, not to exceed twenty-five
percent of the back pay awarded. The court shall not award other
damages, compensatory or punitive, nor shall it order reinstatement
of the employee.
D. Causes of action based upon the public policies reflected in this
chapter shall be exclusively limited to those actions, procedures and
remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights
statutes or local ordinances. Nothing in this section or § 2.1-715 shall
be deemed to alter, supersede, or otherwise modify the authority of the
509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme Court of Virginia
declined the plaintiffs invitation to adopt the federal burden-shifting standard due to "the
Commonwealth's strong commitment to the employment-at-will doctrine, and because we
conclude that Virginia's procedural and evidentiary framework for establishing a prima facie
case is entirely appropriate for trial of wrongful discharge cases."Jordan, 253 Va. at 192,483
S.E.2d at 207. Moreover, the court noted that "in trial of civil actions generally, and in the
trial of wrongful discharge cases specifically, a plaintiff may prove a prima facie case by
circumstantial as well as direct evidence." Id. The court then applied traditional standards
in rejecting the plaintiffs claim on the grounds that there was insufficient circumstantial
evidence to establish the race discrimination claim. See id. at 193,483 S.E.2d at 207-08. Thus,
afterJordan, traditional state law burdens of proof were applied in evaluating the sufficiency
of public policy discriminatory discharge claims.
58. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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Council on Human Rights or of any local human rights or human
relations commissions .... 59
While there is little or no legislative history in Virginia, the
legislature's intent in enacting the "Lockhart-Amendments"
appeared to be plain: to reverse Lockhart.
In Doss v. Jamco, Inc.,6° the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
the continuing availability of Lockhart claims after the 1995
amendments to the VHRA- 1' In that case, the supreme court held
that the amendments plainly manifested the General Assembly's
intent to alter the common law and to limit actions based on
violations of the policies reflected in the VHRA to applicable
statutory causes of action and remedies.62 The supreme court
concluded that permitting the plaintiff to maintain her public policy
claim based on alleged violations of the policy stated in the VHRA
would circumvent and render meaningless the mandate of the
amendments that the actions for violations of such policies be
"exclusively limited" to statutory causes of action.63 Thus, the
supreme court decided that the 1995 amendments preclude plaintiffs
from relying on the policies reflected in the VHRA as the basis for a
common-law claim for wrongful discharge.'
In response to Doss, plaintiffs began asserting public policy claims
with mixed success in reliance on policies expressed elsewhere in the
Virginia Code, the Constitution of Virginia, local ordinances, and
even federal statutes.65 This required the supreme court once again
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997).
61. See id. at 370, 492 S.E.2d at 445.
62. See id. at 371, 492 S.E.2d at 446.
63. See id.
64. See id.; see also Humphreyv. Columbia/HCA John Randolph, Inc., 46 Va. Cir. 109,111
(Chesterfield County 1998) (citing Doss and holding that the VHRA "cannot support the
plaintiffs cause of action in her motion for judgment"); Flayhart v. Interocean Ugland Mgt.
Corp., 45 Va. Cir. 542, 546 (Norfolk City 1998) (citing the same proposition as Humphrey);
Dearing v. Thor, Inc., No. CL97001222-00 (Roanoke City Cir. Ct. June 18, 1998) (sustaining
demurrer to extent public policy claim is based on VHRA).
65. Compare Oakley v. May Dep't Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533,535-36 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(rejecting plaintiffs reliance on the V-RA, Title VII, and Virginia Code section 18.2-57
(assault and battery crime)), and Joyner v. Fillion, 17 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(rejecting plaintiffs reliance on the Constitution of Virginia and Virginia Code section 15.1-
48.1, which prohibits discrimination by the constitutional officer), and McCarthy v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 823, 829-30 (E.D. Va. 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs reliance on
the Constitution of Virginia, a local ordinance, and Title VII), and Blake v. Timber Truss
Hous. Sys., Inc., No. 97-00097-C, 1998 WL 213699, at *4-5 (W.D. Va. 1998) (unreported
decision) (rejecting reliance on Virginians with Disabilities Act), and Flayhart v. Interocean
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to address the availability of public policy discriminatory discharge
claims after the 1995 amendments.
3. The Supreme Court Holds That the "Lockhart-Amendments" Bar
Public Policy Claims Based on the Policies Expressed in the Virginia
Human Rights Act, Regardless of Whether There Are Other Sources
of the Policy-Conner v. National Pest Control Ass'n6"
On February 26, 1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Conner
v. National Pest Control Ass'n addressed the availability of claims
based on policies reflected in the Virginia Human Rights Act where
those same policies are expressed elsewhere." In Conner, the
supreme court held that the VHRA precludes actions based on a
violation of public policies enunciated in both the VHRA and other
provisions of state, federal, or local statutes or ordinances.68
In Conner, the plaintiff alleged that the termination of her
employment "'constituted discrimination... based on her gender' [in
violation of] the public policy against... discrimination in employ-
ment as articulated in the VHRA and other provisions of Virginia
and federal law."69 The defendant demurred on the ground that the
claim was precluded by the 1995 amendments to the VHRA.70 The
trial court sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiff appealed.7 '
On appeal, the supreme court held that actions based on alleged
violations of policies reflected in both the VHRA and some other
state, federal, or local statute are precluded as a matter of law by
the 1995 amendments to the VHRA.72 In reaching this decision, the
Ugland Mgt. Corp., 45 Va. Cir. 542, 546 (Norfolk City 1998) (sustaining demurrer to extent
public policy claim is based on Virginia Code section 18.2-387 (indecent exposure crime)), with
Rodriguez v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 44 Va. Cir. 405, 406-07 (Newport
News City 1998) (denying demurrer in post-"Lockhart-Amendment" case to extent public
policy claim is based on Virginians with Disabilities Act, holding that "[a]s long as there is
a statutory embodiment of the public policy independent of the VHRA, the common law
wrongful discharge claim is available since Bowman and its progeny survive"), and Dearing,
No. CL97001222-00 (denying demurrer to extent public policy claim is based on Virginia's
Fair Contracting Act).
66. 257 Va. 286, 513 S.E.2d 398 (1999).
67. See id. at 288, 513 S.E.2d at 398-99.
68. See id. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
69. Id. at 288, 513 S.E.2d at 399 (alteration in original).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
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supreme court concluded, as it had in Doss, that the VHRA's
exclusivity provision would be circumvented and rendered meaning-
less if the plaintiff "could maintain her common law action based
upon an alleged violation of a policy enunciated in the VHRA by
simply citing a different Virginia Code section or other source of
public policy which enunciated the same policy."73 Moreover, the
supreme court noted that the General Assembly made statutory
causes of action the "exclusive avenues for pursuing a remedy for an
alleged violation of any public policy 'reflected in' the VHRA,"
regardless of whether the policy was also reflected or expressed
elsewhere.74 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal
of plaintiffs claim.75
After Conner, it appears that public policy discriminatory
discharge claims are no longer available under Virginia common law.
The long-term effect of Conner should be to channel employment
discrimination claims back through the administrative procedures
contemplated by the federal antidiscrimination statutes. Claimants
employed by employers with fifteen or more employees (or twenty or
more in the case of age discrimination) may pursue such claims.7"
Before resorting to litigation, such claimants must file charges of
discrimination with the EEOC (or designated state or local deferral
agencies) and attempt to resolve their claims voluntarily through the
administrative process.77 In addition, employees of certain small
employers may pursue limited claims of employment discrimination
directly under the VHRA. Thus, the result of the "Lockhart-Amend-
ments" and the Conner decision should be to return the state of the
law to its position prior to Lockhart, with the addition of a limited
statutory claim applicable to certain small employers.
B. Reliance on Criminal Statutes
Over the past year, plaintiffs in a number of cases have attempted
to rely on criminal statutes as expressions of"public policy" on which
to ground public policy wrongful discharge claims. In Oakley v. May
Department Stores Co.,78 the plaintiff alleged that her employer
73. Id. at 289, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
74. Id. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400 (emphasis added).
75. See id.
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
78. 17 F. Supp. 2d 533 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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sexually harassed and wrongfully terminated her employment in
violation of Virginia's public policy as articulated, inter alia, in
Virginia Code section 18.2-57, which makes it a crime to commit a
simple assault or an assault and battery.79 The court rejected the
plaintiff's attempted reliance on the criminal statute, explaining:
The statutory public policies that fit the Bowman exception are those
where the employee was discharged for either taking an employment
action expressly permitted by Virginia law, or where the employee is
discharged for exercising statutorily created rights that are not
explicitly protected. In addition, the right must be one designed to
protect the public, not a "private right."
The assault and battery statute relied on by plaintiff does not provide
a Bowman public policy exception for plaintiff to the at-will
employment doctrine. First, section 18.2-57 provides criminal penalties
for those committing assaults and/or batteries. Plaintiffs complaint is
a civil action, alleging a common law tort of assault and battery.
Moreover, Count IV indicates that plaintiffwas assaulted by defendant
... sometime in 1994, yet she was not terminated... until well into
1997. The connection between the two events is not alleged or in
anyway apparent from the complaint. Section 18.2-57 simply does not
support plaintiffs cause of action for wrongful discharge.'
In Humphrey v. Columbia/HCA John Randolph, Inc.,"1 the
plaintiff asserted that her employer discharged her for complaining
about a doctor who allegedly dispensed a misbranded drug. 2 The
plaintiff contended, inter alia, that her discharge violated the public
policy enunciated in the Virginia Drug Control Act, which crimi-
nalizes the misbranding of any drug or delivery of a misbranded
drug.83 In support of her claim, the plaintiff argued that the Virginia
Drug Control Act was designed to promote the health of Virginia
residents and thus expresses a public policy sufficient to support a
Bowman-type claim. 4 The court disagreed and sustained the
defendant's demurrer, explaining:
While the Court would agree that the portion of the act cited here seeks
to prevent misbranded drugs from being distributed and thus protect
members of the public, it is impossible for the Court to see this as an
expression of a specific public policy on which the Bowman exception
79. See id. at 536.
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. 46 Va. Cir. 109 (Chesterfield County 1998).
82. See id.




can be invoked in light of the case law defining such claims. Also, it is
important to note that there is a specific criminal penalty and
enforcement mechanism created by the Virginia Drug Control Act for
a violation of this statute. This underscores the intent of the legislature
that this statute was not to have a separate mechanism for civil
enforcement under the exception to the at-will doctrine.a
The Circuit Court for Fairfax County rejected a similar claim in
Wenig v. Hecht Co., 86 in which the plaintiff attempted to rely on
Virginia Code sections 18.2-57 (Assault and Battery), 18.2-416
(Punishment for Using Abusive Language to Another), 18.2-388
(Profane Swearing and Intoxication in Public), and/or 18.2-499
through 18.2-501 (Conspiracy to Injure Another in Trade Business
or Profession). 7 The court sustained the defendants' demurrers to
the extent the plaintiff was relying on the assault and battery,
abusive language, and profane swearing and intoxication statutes,
noting that:
[T]o some extent, most, if not all, statutes enacted by Virginia are
intended to either preserve public safety, public health or the general
welfare of the citizens. Those rather general connections, even if
supportable in logic, are too attenuated to be the basis of a Bowman
claim given the limited nature of such claims.'
In addition, the court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Virginia's
business conspiracy statute, explaining that "these statutes address
injuries to one's business rather than to one's employment
interests."8 9
In Gochenour v. Beasley,9" the plaintiff alleged that her employer
"secreted a video camera in a wall receptacle [pointing directly] at
the area of her crotch while she was typing,"9 and "the photographs
of her pubic areas were collected by the defendant.., and used for
his own prurient gratification and transmitted over the [Iinternet to
others so inclined."92 The plaintiff allegedly resigned and contacted
85. Id. at 110-11.
86. 47 Va. Cir. 290 (Fairfax County 1998).
87. See id. at 294.
88. Id. at 295 (alteration in original) (quoting Perry v. American Home Prods. Corp., No.
Civ. A.3:96CV 595, 1997 WL 109658, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 1997).
89. Id. (citing Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1259 (4th Cir. 1985); Jordan v. Hudson,
690 F. Supp. 502,507 (E.D. Va. 1988); Zimper v. LVI Energy Recovery Corp., 23 Va. Cir. 423
(Fairfax County 1991)).
90. 47 Va. Cir. 218 (Rockingham County 1998).
91. Id. at 219.
92. Id.
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the police concerning possible criminal prosecution.9 3 After first
concluding that claims of constructive discharge in violation of public
policy are actionable, the court turned its analysis to the public
policy foundation for the plaintiffs claim.94
The court addressed whether "the criminal prohibition on filming,
videotaping and photographing persons' genitalia and other private
parts without their permission and under circumstances in which
they would have an expectation of privacy [is] a statutorily articu-
lated public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia on which to
support a wrongful termination claim."95 After examining the scant
authority in Virginia on the issue of criminal statutes as the public
policy basis for wrongful discharge claims, as well as authority from
other jurisdictions,96 the court concluded that "certain of the penal
statutes of the Commonwealth of Virginia articulate a public policy
that may be a sufficient basis for a Bowman wrongful termination
claim."97 With regard to the statute in question, the court held that
the plaintiffs claim was actionable, noting:
In the instant case the public policy that is implicated is patently clear.
Section 18.2-386.1 of the Code of Virginia is clearly a statute designed
to protect people's privacy and to prohibit the surreptitious filming,
photographing or videotaping of a person's private parts without their
permission. This protection is afforded to all of the citizens of the
Commonwealth, and it is hard to conceive of a public policy more
embedded in basic concepts of common decency and civility. It would
seem axiomatic that if the public policy that was implied from the
corporate code concerning the unfettered right of shareholders to vote
on corporate mergers was a sufficient basis for a Bowman claim that
the public policy articulated in this portion of the criminal code
protecting citizens from temporarily or permanently recorded
93. See id.
94. See id. at 222. See infra notes 109-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
plaintiffs attempted reliance on the Constitution of Virginia and Virginia Code section 19.2-
59 as sources of public policy.
95. Gochenour, 47 Va. Cir. at 225.
96. See id. at 226-30 (citing Oakley v. May Dep't Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533,536 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (rejecting use of § 18.2-57, the criminal prohibition against assault and battery, as
public policy for a Bowman claim); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025
(Ariz. 1985); Skierkowski v. Creative Graphics Servs., Inc., No. 94-04632425, 1995 WL
283945, at *1 (Conn. Super. May 5, 1995) (unreported decision); Anders v. Specialty Chem.
Resources, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931
P.2d 857 (Utah 1997); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Humphrey v.
Columbia/HCA John Randolph, Inc., 46 Va. Cir. 109 (Chesterfield County 1998).
97. Gochenour, 47 Va. Cir. at 228.
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voyeuristic activity is an equally strong, ifnot far stronger, public policy
upon which to base a wrongftul termination claim."
In Flayhart v. Interocean Ugland Management Corp.," the
plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that when she walked into the defen-
dant's office to deliver a facsimile, she found the defendant "entirely
naked except for a hard hat laid over his genitals" and that he made
no attempt to cover himself.'0 0 The criminal statute upon which the
plaintiff rested her wrongful discharge claim was Virginia Code
section 18.2-387, which provided in pertinent part:
Every person who intentionally makes an obscene display or exposure
of his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any
place where others are present, or procures another to so expose
himself, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.'O
The court noted that "Virginia has yet to recognize a cause of
action for wrongful discharge based on 'indecent exposure' laws, and
this court should not create a new cause of action in plaintiffs
favor."10 2 Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiffs supervisor did
not expose his private parts or otherwise make an obscene display
in violation of the statute because there was no allegation that he
removed the hard hat.' 3
These cases underscore the lack of uniformity presently applied to
cases involving alleged violations of criminal statutes as the public
policy foundation for Bowman-type claims. Until the Supreme Court
of Virginia addresses such issues a plaintiffs likelihood of success
appears to turn on the criminal statute cited and the venue in which
the claims are litigated.
C. Reliance on Virginia's Wage Payment Laws
In Eslami v. Global One Communications, Inc.,'O° the plaintiff
alleged that his employment was terminated in violation of an
98. Id. at 228.
99. 45 Va. Cir. 542 (Norfolk City 1998).
100. Id. at 543.
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-387 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
102. Flayhart, 45 Va. Cir. at 546-47.
103. See id at 547.
104. No. 174096, 1999 WL 51864, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Fairfax County Jan. 11, 1999).
(unreported decision).
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employment contract and that he was not timely compensated for
work performed prior to his termination." 5 The plaintiff asserted a
public policy wrongful discharge claim premised upon Virginia Code
section 40.1-29, which affords employees the right to submit
grievances concerning wage and hour disputes to the Commissioner
of Labor and Industry.' The court sustained the defendant's
demurrer to the wrongful discharge claim on the ground that an
employer's action or inaction in the post-termination phase, such as
improper withholding of wages, cannot give rise to a cause of action
for wrongful discharge.' ° In addition, the court noted that there was
no causal connection between the basis of plaintiffs discharge and
any public policy underlying the wage payment statute insofar as
plaintiff did not allege "that he was wrongfully terminated by [the
defendant] in an effort to withhold timely payment of the compensa-
tion owed him."'
D. Reliance on the Constitution of Virginia
In the continuing search for actionable sources of public policy,
plaintiffs increasingly have attempted to rely upon certain provi-
sions in the Constitution of Virginia. The Circuit Court for Rocking-
ham County recently addressed two such cases. First, in
Gochenour,°9 the court rejected the plaintiffs attempted reliance on
the Constitution of Virginia as an actionable source of public
policy."0 The court noted in this regard that:
"jlit is not possible ... to base a wrongful termination claim, with
nothing more, on the Bill of Rights of the Virginia Constitution." The
reason is that the Constitution acts as a restraint on governmental
actions, not on private actions.... [P]ermitting a Bowman wrongful
termination claim to be premised upon the general principles of our
democratic society articulated in the Virginia Bill of Rights would be to
make every employment termination case actionable. There would be
few terminations of employment that a skillful lawyer could not with
some degree of candor characterize as violating the terminated
employee's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness by taking
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at *3.
108. Id.
109. 47 Va. Cir. 218 (Rockingham County 1998); see also supra text accompanying notes
90-98.
110. See id. at 223.
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away his or her means of earning a living. The sweeping breadth of
such a claim is clear evidence that it cannot stand as the premise for a
Bowman type claim."'
Similarly, the court rejected the plaintiffs attempted reliance
upon the prohibition on warrantless searches contained in Virginia
Code section 19.2-59, explaining that that provision "does not apply
to private individuals or businesses but only applies to circumscribe
the activities of 'individuals who by virtue of their governmental
employment can be found guilty of malfeasance in office.'"" 2
In Shifflet v. Lewis,"3 the plaintiff alleged that his employment
was terminated because he consulted an attorney after seeking
reimbursement from the defendant for medical expenses incurred as
a result of an alleged work-related accident." 4 In support of his
claim the plaintiff contended, inter alia, that "Article I, § 11, of the
Virginia Constitution, which guarantees Due Process of Law,
includes the 'right to retain and/or consult with counsel in a civil
matter so that one may have meaningful access to the courts."' 5
Foreshadowing its holding in the case, the Circuit Court of Rocking-
ham County began its analysis by observing that:
Given the overriding importance in a democracy for a citizen to know
and obey the law, it would seem clear that any citizen must have a right
to consult with an attorney to know the law and to learn of his or her
rights under the law. Because denying a working person of the right to
consult a lawyer with the threat of losing his or her job seems
antithetical to the fundamentals of a nation which operates by the rule
of law, it would seem that there must be such a right and a means of
protecting that right."6
The court first noted that the Constitution of Virginia has been
widely held to restrict only the acts of government, and not those of
private citizens." 7 Because there was no allegation of governmental
activity in the employer's actions, the court held that the "[p]laintiff
111. Id. (quoting Shiflett v. Lewis, 47 Va. Cir. 95, 101 (Rockingham County 1998)).
112. Id. at 224 (quoting Buonocore v. C&P Tel. Co., 254 Va. 469,473,492 S.E.2d 439,441
(1997)).
113. 47 Va. Cir. 95 (Rockingham County 1998).
114. See id. at 96.
115. Id. at 99 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 100.
117. See id. at 101 (citing Town of Madison v. Ford, 255 Va. 429,432,498 S.E.2d 235,236
(1998) ("[Tlhe Virginia Constitution... establish[es] the limits of governmental action.");
Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219,226, 72 S.E.2d 506,510-11 (1952) ("The office and purpose of
the constitution is to shape governmental activity.").
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cannot premise a Bowman claim solely on the provisions of the
Virginia Constitution because our Constitution does not, standing
alone, restrict activities of private citizens.""8
Next, the court turned its attention to the various statutes
"enacted for the protection of working individuals""9 and opined:
Although it is an exceedingly close call, this Court is of the view that
the numerous statutes which the legislature has enacted to protect
workers as well as the general common law principal that all persons
are presumed to know and obey the law, provide an articulated public
policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia that an employee has a
statutorily protected right to consult with a lawyer to learn his or her
rights under the law. To rule otherwise would be contrary to the very
concept of being a "nation of laws and not of men." If the defendants'
position were accepted, the working people of this Commonwealth
would be subjected to being forced, under the pain of losing theirjob, to
a life of complete ignorance of the rights and protections the legislature
has seen fit to afford them. This cannot be the result contemplated by
the legislature.
... To deny a working person the right to consult a lawyer is every
bit as violative of the public policy of Virginia contemplated by the
various statutes designed to protect workers, as denying an employee
who is a shareholder of his or her employer-corporation the right to cast
his or her vote for a slate of candidates at an annual or special meeting
of shareholders. 
120
Based on this analysis, the court limited its holding to those cases
where a plaintiff merely has consulted with an attorney.'12 The court
did not expressly decide whether an employee may be terminated for
having retained an attorney to bring an action against his or her
employer. 122
118. Shifflet, 47 Va. Cir. at 102.
119. Id. at 103 (citing Virginia Code sections 40.1-52 to -77 (discussing laws regulating,
inter alia, unions, strikes, and right to work); sections 40.1-78 to -116 (regarding child labor
laws); sections 40.1-22 to -28.7 (discussing occupational health and safety); section 40.1-27.1
(discussing the discharge of employees for work-related injuries); and sections 40.1-1 to -11
(referring to the hiring of illegal aliens, etc.)).
120. Id. at 103-04.
121. See id. at 104.
122. See id. The court also denied the defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs claim that he was
terminated in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act, Virginia Code section 65.2-308(B),
which provides: "The employee may bring an action in a circuit court having jurisdiction over
the employer or person who allegedly discharged the employee in violation of this section."
Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-308(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
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The Shifflet decision alarmed employers because of the lack of a
defined, specific expression of public policy giving rise to the
plaintiffs claim.1" Instead, the court appeared to rely upon a vague
penumbra emanating from a loosely connected set of employment
protection statutes to create a public policy regarding consultation
with counsel.
E. The Supreme Court Clarifies the Plaintiffs Burden of Proof
and Confirms the Availability of Punitive Damages in Public
Policy Wrongful Discharge Cases
On April 17, 1998, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in the case of
Shaw v. Titan Corp.,"2 responded to two questions certified to it by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The first
question concerned "the adequacy of jury instructions given on the
issue of causation in a common law action for wrongful termination
of employment."125 The second question involved "the availability of
punitive damages in such an action."'26
In Shaw, the plaintiff alleged he was terminated from his
employment because of his race, gender, and age. 2 7 The defendant
removed the case to federal court, and thereafter, a jury returned a
verdict in the plaintiffs favor, awarding compensatory and punitive
damages."2 The employer argued before the supreme court that the
district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with regard to an
explicit "but-for" causation standard, a "sole" causation standard, or
a "mixed motive" causation standard, and that the court erred in
awarding punitive damages. 2 9
The supreme court began its analysis by rejecting the plaintiffs
first assignment of error. 30 The court noted that the district court
instructed the jury to find in favor of the plaintiff if the plaintiff
123. Indeed, the plaintiff in Shifflet did not appear to specify the precise statute the
employer contravened, as required by the supreme court in Brooks. See Lawrence Chrysler
Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98-99, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996). The decision thus
appears to be at odds with the supreme court's continued emphasis on the narrow availability
of this exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. See id
124. 255 Va. 535, 498 S.E.2d 696 (1998).
125. Id. at 538, 498 S.E.2d at 697.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 539, 498 S.E.2d at 698.
128. See id. at 539-40, 498 S.E.2d at 698.
129. See id. at 541, 498 S.E.2d at 699.
130. See id.
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proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer
intentionally terminated his employment because of his race,
gender, age, or a combination of these factors.'3 ' In addition, the
court noted the district court instructed the jury that if the employer
fired the plaintiff for nondiscriminatory reasons, the jury was
required to return a verdict in favor of the employer." 2 The court
concluded that these instructions "fully and fairly stated the
common law of Virginia in effect" at the time the plaintiffs claim
accrued. 133 In so holding, the court explained that "[a] plaintiff is not
required to prove that the employer's improper motive was the sole
cause of the wrongful termination." 34 The court further noted that
the district court's instructions adequately incorporated Virginia's
common-law stand-ard of proximate causation." 5 Moreover, the
court stated that "the common law of Virginia has not presently
adopted the 'mixed motive' causation standard."36
The court then turned to the issue of the availability of punitive
damages. 1 Citing its previous decisions in Bowman, Bailey, and
Lockhart, the court explained that public policy wrongful discharge
claims sound in tort. 38 Because a plaintiff may recover punitive
damages if he pleads and proves an intentional tort, the court found
that the district court did not err in awarding punitive damages.' 39
II. NEGLIGENCE IN HIRING, RETENTION, AND SUPERVISION
Tort actions in which the employer was alleged to be responsible
for the acts of its employees received a great deal of attention in the
131. See id. at 542, 498 S.E.2d at 699.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 543, 498 S.E.2d at 700.
135. See id. at 544, 498 S.E.2d at 700.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 545, 498 S.E.2d at 701 (citing Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va.
534, 540, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985); Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 125, 480
S.E.2d 502, 504 (1997); Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 105, 439




Virginia courts this year. Outgrowths of the doctrine of respondeat
superior,4 ° claims of negligent hiring, 4 negligent retention,14 and
negligent supervision4  are becoming more commonplace and have
been actively litigated in Virginia's courts. Most noteworthy among
decisions in this area was Southeastern Apartments Management,
Inc. v. Jackman,' a case in which the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed a trial court's verdict against the owner of an apartment
building on theories of negligent hiring and negligent retention.145
The court held that the tenant failed to establish a prima facie case
on either front.146 At the same time, however, the court unequivo-
cally announced that Virginia recognizes the tort of negligent
retention. 47
Prior to the court's decision in Jackman, courts in Virginia were
split on the issue of the viability of the tort of negligent retention. 48
Employees argued that because negligent hiring is recognized as an
actionable claim, logic would dictate that Virginia also recognizes
negligent retention as an actionable claim. Some courts were
140. "Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious act
of his employee if the employee was performinghis employer's business and actingwithin the
scope of his employment when the tortious act was committed." Kensington Assocs. v. West,
234 Va. 430, 432, 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987).
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently issued a decision involving the doctrine of
respondeat superior, which has been touted by some as "set[ting] an outer limit on employer
liability." Deborah Elkins, Employer Was Not Liable for Workplace Assault: Respondeat
Superior BeingReinedln?, VA. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 26, 1999, at AI; see Giant of Maryland, Inc.
v. Enger, 257 Va. 513, 516, 515 S.E.2d 111, 112-13 (1999) (reversing jury verdict in favor of
an elderly customer hit by a supermarket clerk, explaining that the test for employer liability
is not "whether the tortious act itself is a transaction within the ordinary course of the
business of the master.., but whether the service itself, in which the tortious act was done,
was within the ordinary course of such business"); Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 77-78, 112
S.E. 628, 631 (1922).
141. "[N]egligent hiringis a doctrine ofprimary liability; the employer is principally liable
for negligently placing an unfit person in an employment situation involving an unreasonable
risk of harm to others." J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206,211,372 S.E.2d
391,394 (1988).
142. Negligent retention is distinct from a negligent hiring or negligent'supervision claim
in that the employee argues the employer knew of the offender's prior bad acts, but kept the
offender in his position anyway, thus unreasonably exposing others to harm. See Paul
Fletcher, Negligent Retention: Your Success May Depend on Whether You Sue in State or
Federal Court, VA. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 29, 1997, at BI.
143. Negligent supervision claims allege that the employer negligently monitored the
offender's activities.
144. 257 Va. 256, 513 S.E.2d 395 (1999).
145. See id. at 262, 513 S.E.2d at 398.
146. See id. at 261, 513 S.E.2d at 397.
147. See id. at 260, 513 S.E.2d at 397.
148. See, e.g., Tremel v. Reid, 45 Va. Cir. 364,383 (Albemarle County 1998).
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persuaded by this argument, but until Jackman, there had been
little guidance on the subject from Virginia's highest court. 49
In Jackman, a tenant allegedly molested by the apartment's
maintenance supervisor sued the owner of the building for the
negligent hiring and retention of the employee. 5 ' The tenant,
Kimberly Jackman ("Jackman"), woke up during the night to find
the maintenance supervisor of her building, Douglas Turner
("Turner"), standing in her apartment.'5 ' After stating that "he had
had quite a bit to drink," Turner sat down beside Jackman and
began rubbing her thigh.'52 He left the apartment after she pleaded
with him to leave.'53 Jackman then fled the building and reported
the incident to the police. 54
The jury entered judgment in favor of Jackman, finding that the
building owner was negligent in his hiring and retention of Turner,
and awarded Jackman damages in the amount of $12,500.' The
owner of the building appealed the decision on the ground that the
evidence Jackman presented was insufficient to create a prima facie
case of either negligent hiring or negligent retention.'56
In discussing the negligent hiring claim, the court detailed the
process by which Turner was hired.'57 One of several applicants for
the advertised job of maintenance supervisor, Turner submitted a
"very professionally printed" personal resume.' 8 Subsequently, the
apartment resident manager, Melanie L. Ayscue ("Ayscue"), and the
apartment regional manager interviewed Turner.'59 As part of the
application process, Turner signed a release allowing the employer
to inquire into his work, educational, and credit history by contact-
ing his personal references and looking at public records. 60 Ayscue
was able to talk with only two of the six people Turner listed as







156. See id. at 258,513 S.E.2d at 396. The building owner also appealed the lower court's
failure to rule that his negligence if any, was not a proximate cause of the tortious conduct.
However, because of the supreme court's stance on the first issue, the court declined to reach
the proximate cause issue. See id.





personal references, both of whom gave him a good recommenda-
tion. 6' Turner indicated on his application that of thirty-four crimes
listed, he had only committed [t]raffic [v]iolations." 62 Ayscue
performed a background check on Turner, but failed to obtain a copy
of his criminal record.'63 She testified that the law did not mandate
she do so." Finally, Turner scored "fine" on a behavioral test he
took before being hired.'65 Ayscue hired Turner with the regional
manager's approval.
66
The court noted that while the tort of negligent hiring is
recognized in Virginia, Jackman failed to state a prima facie case of
negligent hiring as a matter of law because there was nothing to put
the building owner on notice that hiring Turner might lead to a
sexual assault on a tenant.'67 None of the information gathered in
connection with Turner's application indicated that he might have
"a propensity to molest women," his recommendations were
favorable, and his application did not suggest a problem. 161 Further-
more, the court found that reasonable care did not require the
employer to investigate Turner's criminal record and dismissed as
inconsequential the tenant's argument that an examination of that
record would have disclosed several bad checks Turner had written
years earlier.'69
Regarding the negligent retention claim, the court mentioned
Ayscue's suspicion that Turner had an alcohol or drug abuse problem
and her observations concerning Turner's "romantic" interest in
women living in the apartment complex.170 The supreme court
quickly determined these facts were not indicia that Turner was "a
dangerous employee and one likely to commit sexual assaults."'7 '
Jackman also brought out at trial that Ayscue mentioned to her that
she and a fellow employee found Turner to be "obnoxious" and
avoided him during their lunch breaks.172 The supreme court dealt












172. See id. at 262, 513 S.E.2d at 398.
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in the opinion of other employees, [does not] furnish notice to an
owner exercising reasonable care that the employee is likely to
sexually assault tenants."'73
In Courtney v. Ross Stores, Inc.,'74 the Circuit Court of Fairfax
County was confronted with a Motion for Judgment alleging the
employer was guilty of negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
negligent supervision of an employee who verbally abused a
customer on the basis of racial animosity. 175 The court granted
defendant's .demurrer as to the negligent hiring and supervision
counts but overruled the demurrer on the negligent retention
claim.176
In addressing the negligent hiring count, the court mentioned that
the tort had a history in Virginia, dating back to 1903.77 The court
acknowledged that most negligent hiring cases involved some sort
of physical harm to the plaintiff; however, physical harm was not
required to make a prima facie case.1 8 What is required, according
to the court, is knowledge. 179 A plaintiff must demonstrate to the
court
that an employee had a propensity for the conduct that ultimately
resulted in the injury to others and knowledge of the propensity was
reasonably discoverable; the employer failed to inquire; and, had the
employer inquired, it would not have placed the employee in the
position that it did.... [Ulnlike the knowledge element for negligent
supervision or retention, the knowledge must occur prior to the hiring
or placement.'i s
The court found that no facts were presented that would satisfy the
knowledge requirement for negligent hiring. 8'
In opining on the tort of negligent retention, the court noted that
for liability to be imposed, the employer must "negligently retain or
fail to fire or remove an employee after learning of the employee's
173. Id.
174. 45 Va. Cir. 429 (Fairfax County 1998).
175. See id. at 429.
176. See id. at 431-32.




181. See id. at 431.
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incompetence, negligence, or unfitness for a position.""8 2 The court
held there was sufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs allega-
tions that Ross was aware of the employee's discriminatory conduct
toward African-Americans and overruled the demurrer. 83
By swiftly dealing with the charge of negligent supervision in
granting Ross Stores' demurrer, the court concluded: "In Virginia
there is no duty of reasonable care imposed upon an employer in the
supervision of its employees under these circumstances and we will
not create one here."
1
'
The Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk also had the opportunity
to rule on claims of negligent hiring and retention.'85 Dorothy Berry
("Berry"), an employee of Scott & Stringfellow, allegedly was
subjected to repeated sexual harassment from her supervisor.18 6 The
court granted the defendant's demurrer with respect to Berry's
negligent hiring claim, ruling that Berry "must allege acts of her
supervisor, prior to his employment, which would have suggested to
Scott & Stringfellow that Walker had the propensity to sexually
harass and assault female employees and was, therefore, unfit for
the job."'87 In the court's opinion, Berry's assertions did not allege
the necessary facts to make out a successful claim of negligent
hiring.8 8 The court held that Scott & Stringfellow's demurrer to the
negligent retention claim should be overruled because Berry's
motion alleged Scott & Stringfellow had "actual or constructive
knowledge of Walker's propensity to sexually harass and assault
female employees."'89 These facts were sufficient to support a
negligent retention claim. 9 '
The ability of third parties to bring negligent hiring and retention
claims was also argued before a Virginia court in Tremel v. Reid.'9'
Michael Tremel ("Tremel"), a minor, alleged that his Boy Scout
Leader, Floyd Reid ("Reid"), sexually assaulted him on numerous
182. Id.
183. See id. at 432.
184. Id. (citing C&P Tel. Co. of Va. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61,365 S.E.2d 751,754 (1988));
see also Callv. Shaw Jewelers, Inc., No. 3:98CV449,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 636 (E.D. Va. Jan.
7, 1999) (unreported decision).
185. See Berry v. Scott & Stringfellow, 45 Va. Cir. 240 (Norfolk City 1998).
186. See id. at 241.
187. Id. at 248.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 245.
190. See id. at 247.
191. 45 Va. Cir. 364 (Albemarle County 1998).
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occasions."' Both Tremel and his parents brought numerous claims
against Reid, the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA"), the Stonewall
Jackson Area Council ("SJAC"), and the Johnny Reb Corporation. 93
The court ruled that the child's injury did not give the parents a
cause of action based on negligent hiring against SJAC and BSA
because the defendants "owed no legal duty to [the parents] since the
injuries [the parents] complain of grow out of the relationship of
these Defendants to [the parent's] son Michael and not to [the
parents] directly."'94 However, the court allowed Tremel's claims for
negligent hiring and retention to go forward. 95
III. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE AND THE FIDUciARY DUTY OF
LOYALTY
Cases involving the duties, created by both fiduciary responsibili-
ties' 96 and contract, flowing from employee to employer continued to
receive a great deal of coverage in the Virginia courts. Virginia
courts heard a number of cases addressing the attempted enforce-
ment of noncompetition agreements during the past year.
InAdvanced Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. PRC Inc.,' 97 PRC required
all new employees to sign an agreement, part of which read as
follows:
Employee agrees not to compete with PRC for a period of eight months
following termination of employee's employment, by rendering
competing services to or, with respect to such services, solicit any
customer of PRC for whom Employee performed services while
employed by PRC, within 50 miles of a PRC office.19
Because of lost business, PRC informed certain employees in its
marine engineering department that they should begin looking for
192. See id. at 365.
193. See id. at 365.
194. Id. at 383.
195. See id. at 385.
196. Although the focus of this section is on the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements, other cases involving an employee's alleged violation of his fiduciary duties to
the employer deserve brief mention. For example, in Phoenix Financial Corp. v. Radford, 44
Va. Cir. 445,445-46 (Roanoke City 1998), aVirginia circuit court held that an employee's duty
of loyalty ends when the employment relationship is terminated.
197. 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998).
198. Id. at 111, 501 S.E.2d at 151.
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work elsewhere.1 99 Pirrera, a senior manager in this department,
contacted Advanced Marine Enterprises, Inc. ("AME"), a marine
engineering firm, to discover if AME would be interested in hiring
all the managers from PRC's marine engineering department.0 0
AME expressed interest in the idea, and subsequently both AME
and PRC managers began formulating a plan for AME to hire every
employee in PRC's marine engineering department away from
PRC.2
01
The elaborate plan called for AME to make secret offers of
employment to every employee in PRC's marine engineering
department.0 2 According to the plan, all employees would resign
from PRC on the same day, without giving the two weeks notice
required by the company. 2 3 In essence, AME's objective was to
obtain not only PRC's managers and employees, but also its
customers and contracts. 0 4
Aware of the terms of the noncompetition provision in PRC's
employment agreement, the defendants projected the amount of
damages they likely would incur if faced with a lawsuit.20 5 This did
not deter their efforts, however, as they felt the benefits outweighed
any potential liability.20 6
The PRC managers compiled a "matrix" to describe the plan for
luring business away from PRC.20 ' This matrix contained confiden-
tial and proprietary information of PRC, including "the value of
certain work, and the amount of government funding available for
each job in PRC's marine engineering department. 0
AME used the information received from PRC managers to
prepare offers for all employees of PRC's marine engineering
department.0 9 The PRC managers formulated a plan for distributing
the offer letters based on the concern that certain employees might
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 111-12, 501 S.E.2d at 151.
202. See id. at 112, 501 S.E.2d at 151.
203. See id.
204. See id. Of the plan, one PRC manager commented, "the idea was 'to put together an
entity that the [PRC] customer can't live without." Id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 112, 501 S.E.2d at 151-52.
208. Id. The matrix also assessed the ease with which it would be able to divert each
position in the department to AME. See id.
209. See id. at 112, 501 S.E.2d at 152.
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not keep their offer from AME confidential.21 ° According to plan, the
PRC managers gave out the offers encouraging each employee to
accept and say nothing to PRC about the offer.21'
Suspecting that PRC might learn of the plan, Pirrera sent an e-
mail to the other PRC managers."' His message directed the
managers to talk to the other employees and have them back up
computer files, transfer files to clients, and determine their task
backlogs. -3
On the day specified in the plan, PRC's entire marine engineering
department resigned, giving no notice.214 Prior to this, a number of
employees and managers had copied customer files and sent them
to the clients' sites and either copied or removed other confidential
and proprietary information from PRC. 215
PRC instituted an action in state court against AME and the
former PRC managers and employees. 1 6 One of their claims sought
to have the court find the noncompetition agreements enforceable.217
AME argued that the clause should not be enforced "because it was
unreasonably broad, unduly harsh, and oppressive."23 The trial
court disagreed and the supreme court affirmed.1 9
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia began by repeating
the criteria to be considered in evaluating the enforceability of a
covenant not to compete. 2 0 The court found the PRC agreement was
210. See id. at 112-13, 501 S.E.2d at 152.




215. See id. at 113-14, 501 S.E.2d at 152.
216. See id. at 114, 501 S.E.2d at 152.
217. See id. at 114, 501 S.E.2d at 153.
218. Id. at 118, 501 S.E.2d at 155.
219. See id.
220. See id. The court cited the commonly applied considerations for evaluating the
validity of such agreements:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in the
sense that it is no greater than necessary to protect the employer in some
legitimate business interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in the
sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate
efforts to earn a livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public policy?
Id. (citing New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 245 Va. 367, 369, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26




not unduly harsh in limiting the efforts of its former employees to
find work nor was it unreasonable from the standpoint of public
policy.22' Furthermore, the court did not object to the geographic
restriction in the face of PRC having 300 offices worldwide because
the prohibition applied to a narrow line of services and the briefness
of the eight-month restriction.222
Several notable cases regarding the enforceability of restrictive
covenants came before circuit courts in Virginia. In Wheeler v.
223Fredericksburg Orthopedic Assocs., Wheeler, a doctor, sought a
temporary injunction to prohibit her former medical practice group
from interfering with her ability to practice medicine within a thirty-
five mile radius of Fredericksburg.2 4 The court found that because
the language of the covenant did not allow Wheeler to practice as a
doctor, regardless of her specialty, within thirty-five miles of
Fredericksburg, failure to grant the injunction would work a
significant hardship on Wheeler.225 Furthermore, because the
defendants did not even practice in Wheeler's specialty, no irrepara-
ble harm would flow to them by failure to enforce the
noncompetition agreement. 226 Finally, because Wheeler was the only
physician practicing in her specialty within the Fredericksburg area,
non-issuance of the injunction would cause the general public to
suffer.22 7
In a second case, the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond
refused to enforce a noncompetition agreement because it found the
agreement was broader than necessary to protect the employer's
business interests and would seriously impair the former employee's
ability to earn a livelihood. The former manager of Summs
Recovery, Charles Belle, signed a noncompetition agreement that
prohibited him from competing with the employer for one year
221. See id. at 118-19, 501 S.E.2d at 155.
222. See id. at 119, 501 S.E.2d at 155.
223. 44 Va. Cir. 399 (Fredericksburg City 1998).
224. See id. at 399. The noncompetition provision in Wheelers agreement prohibited her
from practicing as a "professional" or practicing medicine within a 35-mile radius of
Fredericksburg. See id.
225. See id.; see also Nida v. Business Advisory Sys., Inc., 44 Va. Cir. 487,498 (Winchester
City 1998) (refusing to enforce a covenant not to provide lender services "anywhere in the
world" because of the breadth of the geographic scope).
226. See id. at 401-02.
227. See id. at 402.
228. See Summs Recovery and Collection, Inc. v. Belle, 44 Va. Cir. 475 (Richmond City
1998).
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within a fifty-mile radius of "any Summs office.""2 9 After his
termination, Summs Recovery asked the court to enforce the
noncompetition agreement, which it declined to do.2"'
The court paid particular attention to the fact that the geograph-
ical scope of the agreement would "span approximately from the
North Carolina border, to the east coast, almost to Charlottesville,
north towards Fredericksburg, and well into Maryland."2 1 The court
found this particularly onerous because there was no evidence that
Suums Recovery had business "south of Petersburg, west of
Richmond, north of Ashland, and in several other locations included
in the geographical reach of the noncompetition agreement" or that
they were trying to expand in those areasY2 The court concluded
that the agreement failed the first two prongs of the three-part
reasonableness test.233
Although the geographical reach of the agreement was its only
real problem, the court refused to edit or "blue-line" the agreement
to make it enforceable. 234 As its reason for refusing to edit the
agreement, the court stated that "it is well established in Virginia
that courts will not rewrite contracts. 235 Given the court's unwilling-
ness to alter the agreement's scope, the court declared the agree-
ment invalid and refused to order its enforcement. 6
Despite the general reluctance among the circuit courts to enforce
covenants not to compete, at least one circuit court stated that an
employer's failure to have an employee sign a covenant not to
compete rendered the employer's assertions that the employee
breached its fiduciary duties to the employer and tortiously inter-
fered with a contract nonactionable. 7 The Circuit Court of Fairfax
County was guided by the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in
Peace v. Conway238 in holding that, in the absence of a convenant not
to compete, the employer did not have a cause of action against an
229. Id. at 477.
230. See id. at 479.
231. Id. at 477.
232. Id. at 477-78.
233. See id. at 478; see also supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the three-
part reasonableness test).
234. See id.
235. Id. at 478.
236. See id.
237. See Deepwood Veterinary Clinic, Inc. v. Sabo, 45 Va. Cir. 508, 509 (Fairfax County
1998).
238. 246 Va. 278, 435 S.E.2d 133 (1993).
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employee who solicited her former employer's customers from a list
compiled by memory and then competed with her former employer
post-termination. 9 Quoting from Justice Hassell's opinion inPeace,
the lower court stated "'it is not unusual in the business world for an
employee to leave his employment and start a competing business.
When this occurs, inevitably customers of the former employer will
desire to continue to deal with the former employee in the new
business." ° In addition, the court held the employee's actions prior
to termination-forming a new corporation, preparing to open her
new business, and agreeing to employ dissatisfied employees of her
former employer-"were mere preparation, not competition, and did
not breach her fiduciary duty to her employer." 1
The issue of assignability of covenants not to compete continued
to be revisited in the courts despite precedent that suggested the
issue is settled.242 In Christian Defense Fund v. Stephen Winchell's
Associates," the Circuit Court of Fairfax County addressed the
assignability of convenants not to compete. 2 Upon resigning from
Hart Conover, Inc. ("HCI"), Benjamin Hart ("Hart") signed a
consulting agreement with HCI agreeing "not to work for or provide
services to the Christian Coalition ("CC") for one year. 2 45
Subsequently, HCI merged with the Christian Defense Fund
("CDF'). " Thereafter, on May 12,1998, "Stephen Winchell & Assoc.,
Inc. ("Winchell"), hired Hart as an independent contractor... on the
CC account."241 CDF sought to enforce the noncompetition provision
signed by Hart against CC.
248
The court refused CDF's request for a temporary injunction
compelling Hart to adhere to the agreement,2 49 commenting that "a
contract for personal services is not assignable unless both parties
239. See Deepwood, 45 Va. Cir. at 509.
240. Id. (quoting Peace, 246 Va. at 282,435 S.E.2d at 135).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Hardee, No. 96-2077, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
36368, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 1997) (unreported decision), affg 932 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Va.
1996).
243. 47 Va. Cir. 148 (Fairfax County 1998).
244. See id. at 150.
245. Id. at 148.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 148-49.
249. See id. at 148.
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agree to the assignment."25 ° According to the court, Hart's personal
services contract "was transferred to CDF without the consent of
Hart by virtue of the merger"; therefore, CDF did not have standing
to enforce the covenant not to compete."'
A case with an unusual application of the duty of loyalty was
Parrish v. Worldwide Travel Service, Inc.252 In Parrish, the plaintiff
was subject to an employment contract with a "just cause" termina-
tion provision.5 3 The employer terminated the employee for failing
to follow instructions with regard to his duties.254 The employee sued
for breach of the contract and the employer contended that the
employee breached his duty of loyalty to his employerY 5 The
Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the employer and ruled that
the employer had sufficient cause to terminate the employee because
"[an employee's duty of loyalty to his employer includes the duty to
follow the employer's reasonable instructions."256
IV. CONCLUSION
By far, the most meaningful decision in Virginia employment law
handed down this past year, if not the past five years, is Conner v.
National Pest Control Ass'n. On its face, Conner appears to bar
public policy discriminatory discharge claims in Virginia and provide
employers and employees alike with a certainty that has eluded
them since the Lockhart decision and its progeny.
While Conner seems to overshadow other employment law
decisions issued during the period in review, the importance and
implication of certain other decisions should not be ignored. The
Jackman court's explicit recognition of the viability of the tort of
negligent retention should put to rest the confusion that permeated
the Commonwealth as to whether such a tort is recognized.
Finally, the evolving case law in the enforcement of noncompe-
tition agreements underscores the necessity of drafting covenants
not to compete that are not overly broad in geographic scope and/or
250. Id. at 150 (citing McGuire v. Brown, 114 Va. 235, 239-42, 76 S.E. 295, 297 (1912);
Epperson v. Epperson, 108 Va. 471, 475-77, 62 S.E. 344, 346 (1908)).
251. Id.
252. 257 Va. 465, 512 S.E.2d 818 (1999).
253. See id. at 466, 512 S.E.2d at 820.
254. See id. at 467, 512 S.E.2d at 819.
255. See id. at 466, 512 S.E.2d at 819.
256. Id. at 468, 512 S.E.2d at 820.
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duration, not unduly burdensome to the employee and their ability
to earn a livelihood, and are rationally related to the employer's
interests.

